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Austerity Politics and Constitutional Crisis in Spain 
 
 
Abstract: This article explores the political consequences of austerity politics in Spain.  It 
argues that the economic-cum-political crisis in Spain has brought to the surface underlying 
structural weaknesses of its constitutional edifice accumulated over the past decades.  The 
article sketches the parameters of the current crisis, and provides an account of the 
dynamic process of crisis and breakdown of Spain’s “constitutional regime.”  It focuses on 
two inter-related institutional arenas of this regime: the party system, and the territorial 
model of governance (the so-called Estado de las Autonomías).  It analyses developments in 
both of these arenas, and assesses the emergent opportunities for transition to a new 
constitutional regime (or regimes), as well as the prospects and policy avenues open for re-
equilibration.  It gives an account of the transition away from two-party politics, and of the 
rise of new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos.  It pays special attention to recent 
events in Catalonia.  It argues that the Catalan authorities’ defection from loyalty to the 
constitutional order was triggered in part by the dynamics of austerity, and that it has 
rendered the country’s constitutional edifice – but not the austerity regime – susceptible to 
collapse.   
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Introduction 
The financial crisis of the Eurozone, combined with the recipe of austerity imposed in 
response, have triggered a crisis of democracy in Spain.  The crisis is not of the magnitude of 
the polarizing process that led to the breakdown of the Second Republic, the stalemated 
coup, and the outbreak of Civil War back in the 1930s, to be sure.  But a crisis of democracy 
it is none the less – more specifically, a crisis of its “constitutional regime.”  By constitutional 
regime, we mean “the matrix of institutional relationships and fundamental values that are 
usually taken as the constitutional baseline in normal political life” (Ackerman 1993, p.59).  
This article will provide an account of the dynamic process of crisis of Spain’s “constitutional 
regime,” focusing on two inter-related institutional arenas of this regime: the party system, 
and the territorial model of governance (the so-called Estado de las Autonomías). 
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A Crisis of the Constitutional Order 
Nearly forty years have passed since Francisco Franco died peacefully in his bed, after nearly 
forty years of autocratic rule.  The in some ways surprisingly smooth transition to 
democracy that took place after the Generalísimo’s death has long been considered a model 
of reformist, pacted transition by comparativists (Maravall 1982; Colomer 2000; Gunther, 
Montero and Botella, 2004; Linz and Stepan 1996).  The Constitution of 1978 has been 
hailed as a political achievement of the highest order, depicted as crafted by genuine 
statesmen from both the regime and the opposition.  A broad coalition of political forces 
with often contradictory programmatic political agendas successfully managed to forge a 
compromise and consensus in support of a new constitutional democratic order (Bonime-
Blanc 1987; Oñate 1998).   
The crafters of the 1978 Constitution were explicitly motivated by the conviction 
that the errors of the past were to be avoided at all costs (Aguilar and Oakley, 2002).  Their 
Hobbesian fear of descent into another “fratricidal” civil war was sublimated into a sense of 
political responsibility, out of which a will to compromise was born, and the Manichean 
spectre of the two Spain’s was exorcised at last.   Or so the story went. 
In recent years, this hegemonic narrative of the transition has come under 
considerable attack.  Revisionist assessments of the origins and distinguishing characteristics 
of the current constitutional order have begun to abound, the “regime” itself disparaged, 
increasingly referred to by the fiercer among its critics as the Second Bourbon Restauration 
(Doménech 2014; Navarro 2006; Santamaría 2012).  
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According to the revisionist critics of the transition paradigm and the so-called 
Regime of 1978, the pacted nature of the transition has seriously damaged the quality of 
democracy in post-transition Spain.  The so-called “pact of forgetting” is increasingly 
challenged, rendered as emblematic not of reconciliation, but of impunity of so many 
implicated in the crimes of the regime.  It is at the same time seen as symptomatic of a 
certain post-fascist and/or lingering national-Catholic mist continuing to mystify the terms 
of collective consciousness in contemporary Spain.     
The flourishing of revisionist responses to such questions amongst intellectuals in 
Spain, and – albeit to a lesser degree – among the general public, the increasing willingness 
to interrogate the foundational myths underpinning the current constitutional order, is 
certainly partly a sign of “democratic maturity,” as the revisionists themselves tend to insist.  
But it is also at least partly endogenous to the policy-regime of austerity.  This policy-regime 
has entailed a significant reduction in terms of the quality of democracy in Spain, with clear 
knock-on effects to the legitimacy of the country’s “constitutional regime” on the whole.  
The criterion of “economic responsibility,” understood as adherence to the hegemonic 
policy-regime of austerity, has come to trump and condition alternative criteria such as 
democratic responsiveness or accountability (Streeck 2011).  In more concrete terms, this 
has meant severe and unpopular cuts in social services, with public spending down 29 billion 
Euros in 2014 compared to 2009, alongside structural reforms focused on the labor market, 
which together have undoubtedly contributed to sharp rises in levels of inequality as well as 
unemployment (Uxó and Álvarez 2016: 3; Busch et. al. 2013: 10).   
 
4 
 
After decades of stasis and even decreasing levels of inequality, in post-crisis 
austerity Spain levels of inequality have increased rapidly, reaching their highest point since 
the transition to democracy (Primer Informe sobre la Desigualdad en España 2013).  Spain 
currently ranks among the most unequal of countries in the EU, with the top 20% in terms 
of income making 6.8 times more than the bottom 20%, more than double the existing 
difference in the rate of Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Holland, or Belgium (Maravall 2013; 
Ayala 2014; Segundo Informe sobre la Desigualdad en España 2015).  The costs in terms of 
public health of the austerity-induced surge in inequality have been well documented (Gili 
et. al. 2012). 
From the onset of the Eurozone crisis up through the middle of 2013, unemployment 
rose at a worrying pace.  The number of unemployed in Spain reached a record 27.1% in the 
first quarter of 2013, with unemployment among immigrants at 39%, and youth 
unemployment at an overwhelming 57%.  Though this disturbing trend has been haulted 
since, levels of unemployment remain over 20% 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/unemployment-rate).  To make matters worse, 
“nearly 50 per cent of the 5.5 million unemployed in Spain have been either unemployed for 
two years or more or have never worked, and there are very high percentages of employed 
people with part-time or temporary labour contracts” (Uxó et. al. 2016: 165). 
From the perspective of constitutional politics, the bleakness of the current 
conjuncture is perhaps best captured by the collusion in August of 2011 of the socialist 
Zapatero government with Rajoy’s conservative party then in opposition in agreeing to 
amend article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, the article pertaining to public debt, so as to 
prohibit budgetary deficits, a move that explicitly imitates a 2009 German reform and 
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basically rules out by constitutional fiat recourse to counter-cyclical stimulus packages 
(Chaqués-Bonafont et. al. 2015: 58-59; Cordero and Montero 2015: 359).  They did so 
without even bothering to consult the demos via referendum about taking such a drastic 
measure.  Their alibi for colluding in this neo-liberal constitutional coup of sorts: credibility 
in the eyes of financial markets.   
Such a credible commitment to the recipe of austerity may well have functioned in 
terms of placating the idols of international finance, especially after the subsequent victory 
of Rajoy’s conservative party in the general election of December 2011.  Even so, the 
Constitutional pantomime proved damaging to the credibility of the main parties 
nonetheless, in large part because both main parties (especially the conservative Partido 
Popular) had spent a good part of the previous decade responding to peripheral-nationalist 
demands for constitutional reform with a variety of arguments centered around the theme 
of the need to be cautious before “opening up the Constitutional melon” and fiddling with 
the great but delicate historic achievement of the exceptionally broad constitutional 
consensus forged by the founding Fathers of the Constitution and ratified via referendum 
back in 1978.       
Meanwhile, the progressive emaciation of the income and purchasing power of the 
Spanish popular classes accompanying higher levels of unemployment has led to increasing 
difficulties for small businesses, and therefore for the Spanish government to secure from 
tax revenues enough cash in state coffers to continue making payments on the country’s 
sovereign debt.  Meanwhile, public debt has continued to creep upwards, and is currently at 
99.2%, towering over the 36.1% of government debt registered before the 2008 bailout of 
the banks (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/government-debt-to-gdp).   
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Simultaneous retrenchments in the realm of economic opportunities, material well-
being and social rights have in turn set the stage for the exposure of the systemic corruption 
built into the Spanish political economy.  A politics of scandal (Heywood 2007: Jiménez 
2004) has re-emerged, in which nearly all of the establishment political parties have been 
implicated.  
From 2013, the governing conservative Partido Popular has faced a serious and on-
going party finance scandal, implicating many of the party’s most prominent figures, 
including several cabinet members, not to mention Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (and the 
former one, José María Aznar).  So too has the conservative Catalan nationalist 
Convergència Democràtica been plagued by a string of scandals, including most notably the 
confession of tax evasion and money laundering via secret Swiss and Andorran bank 
accounts by the ex-President of the Generalitat, Jordi Pujol.  Nor has the socialist opposition 
manage to escape the muck, though the main corruption scandals affecting it would pertain 
mostly to the local level, where all the main parties have been implicated in widespread 
practices of misusing public funds for personal gain and accepting bribes in exchange for 
concessions of licenses for construction during the housing-market boom (Jiménez 2009).   
Against this backdrop of scandalous revelations still working their way through the 
judicial system and widely reported in the mass media, higher and higher percentages of the 
Spanish public have come to perceive corruption to be one of the main problems 
confronting the country.  As late as 2012, less than 10% of the Spanish public had 
mentioned corruption among the main problems confronting the country; but by 2013, the 
proportion surpassed 30%, and now hovers around nearly 40% 
(http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/11_barometros/index.jsp).  Indeed, an increasing 
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proportion of the public seems to have concluded that the series of corruption scandals 
rocking the political establishment is not just an issue of a few or even a lot of “bad apples”; 
rather, such scandals reflect the workings of a system corrupted to the core (López 2014; 
Villoría et. al. 2013; Santamaría 2012).   
 
Transformations in the Party System 
But every crisis brings with it new opportunities.  The very same stresses on the social fabric 
caused by the sharp rises in inequality, high unemployment, cuts in welfare services, and 
the exposure of systemic corruption has created an ideological climate more propitious for 
“contentious” brands of politics and even of popular mobilization, if not exactly the 
awakening of long-dormant, perhaps defunct, militant class consciousness.   
Which brings us to the first institutional arena in which the crisis of Spain’s 
“constitutional regime” has emerged – namely, the crisis of the party system (Wilson 2012; 
Gunther et. al. 2004).  How best to capture the significance of this dimension or institutional 
arena of constitutional crisis?  Here Antonio Gramsci’s notion of “organic crisis” remains 
useful.  According to the still-unsurpassed theorist of hegemony, such crises take place 
when large segments of the population (in Gramsci’s view, social classes) “become detached 
from their traditional parties” – more specifically, when they become detached from the 
“particular organizational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent, and lead 
them” (1971: 210).  In these situations, the representatives of the main established parties 
are no longer recognized by core constituencies as genuine “expressions” of the group.  
Furthermore, as Lustick has likewise elaborated, for Gramsci, at the origin of these “organic 
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crises,” there lie “drastic changes which bring to light ‘incurable contradictions’ ” – 
contradictions which in turn “undermine the self-confidence of state elites and ruling groups 
and weaken the ability of prevailing conceptions to limit entry of new kinds of questions 
into the public domain” (1993: 122).   
Anyone paying attention to the drama still unfolding on the Spanish political stage 
can easily recognize similarities with the patterns described above by Gramsci and Lustick, 
even if the “incurability” of the contradictions remains an open question, and “re-
equilibration” a distinct possibility.  The financial crisis and the response of austerity has 
meant for Spain the bursting of a bubble much bigger than that of the housing market 
alone.  Indeed, it has entailed a “drastic change,” one that has brought to light serious 
‘contradictions’, though whether these will prove “incurable” remains an open question.  
The first sign that a “drastic change” was underway came in May of 2011, when the 
Indignado or 15-M movement erupted onto the Spanish political scene with an impressive 
display of relatively spontaneous popular force (Calvo 2013).  The people who came out in 
protest over the policies of austerity to occupy public squares in May of 2011, with waves of 
indignant citizens overflowing out of Madrid’s Puerta del Sol and Barcelona’s Plaza de 
Catalunya, drew significant international attention, eliciting comparisons with the Arab 
Spring, especially events in Tahir square (Muñoz et. al. 2014).  The emblematic slogan of the 
Indignados directly called into question the democratic quality of the country’s 
representative institutions: “¡No nos representan!”  Indeed, the phrase “Spanish revolution” 
even briefly enjoyed a certain present-tense, non-ironic resonance for the first time in over 
seven decades.   
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Even so, the crowds soon thinned and the occupations were eventually dismantled, 
with the help of some strong-armed police tactics.  And in November of 2011, the Spanish 
demos chose to hold the incumbent socialist administration accountable for its performance 
by rendering a decisively anti-revolutionary electoral verdict that gave an absolute majority 
to the conservative Partido Popular (Anduiza et. al. 2014).  
Yet the conservatives’ electoral victory did not signal an end to widespread 
disenchantment; to the contrary, the country’s representative institutions, especially its two 
main state-wide political parties, would remain the objects of much contempt by broad 
swathes of the demos throughout a legislature that began with unprecedented cuts – 27 
billion euros slashed from the 2012 budget, with health and education hit the hardest – and 
included other controversial measures such as freezes in the wages of civil servants as well 
as an important liberalizing labor market reform (Legido-Quigley et. al. 2013; Cordero and 
Montero 2015; Uxó et. al. 2016).  
In 2013, the Partido Popular would be engulfed in scandal with the exposure of a 
parallel accounting system and illegal slush fund for prominent party officials.  This was 
brought to light by the publication in El País of the handwritten account ledgers by former 
party treasurer, Luís Bárcenas, a scandal which significantly undermined the credibility of 
Mariano Rajoy’s government.  However, the socialist opposition proved incapable of taking 
advantage of the scandal.  The public seemed still unwilling to forgive them for their 
management of the economy after the bursting of the bubble in 2008, and certainly still 
remembered the PSOE’s long record as an establishment party, especially its direct 
implication in the systemic corruption of the pre-crisis period.  As a result, the PSOE 
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remained even more discredited in the eyes of a Spanish electorate ever more angry at the 
political status quo.   
In the wake of the Bárcenas scandal, clear signs could be detected in public opinion 
surveys that major transformations in the country’s party system were looming on the 
horizon.  The first casualty of such realignment would be the longstanding trend towards a 
two-party system.  This trend had been “progressively accentuated during the first thirty 
years of democracy, up through the election of 2008, in which the PP and the PSOE together 
concentrated 84% of votes and 92% of seats” (Barreiro 2013).  In 2011, for the first time this 
was not the case – “the two parties did not increase their combined proportion of support,” 
though the concentration of the votes and seats remained very high, at 73% of votes and 
85% of seats, respectively.  
In the European elections of May 2014, a new political force erupted onto the scene 
– Podemos, with its impressive baptismal performance of five Euro-deputies (Cordero and 
Montero 2015).  Podemos would initially derive its legitimation from the Indignado 
movement, though its early flirtation with Assembly-style direct democracy soon gave way 
to a high degree of centralized plebiscitary control around the figure of Pablo Iglesias and a 
highly-cohesive group of his academic friends.  The young political scientists from the 
Complutense University in Madrid at the helm of the new party demonstrated a significant 
amount of tactical agility in spreading their counter-hegemonic critique of the “political 
caste” in the mass media.  They openly called for a “constitutive moment,” even a “rupture” 
with the governing “regime” (Delclós 2014; Flescher Fominaya 2014; Stobart 2014).  In the 
weeks and months following the European election, Podemos would surge in opinion polls.  
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By the end of the year, the party was even polling first in some surveys of projected votes 
among the Spanish public.   
Hopeful commentators on the left across Europe and in North America were quick to 
predict an impending victory for the upstart party.  The politics of austerity, they insisted, 
was destined to fundamentally alter the balance of class forces in favour of the materially 
dominated and the dispossessed in Spain, just as it had in Greece.  The regime of austerity 
was doomed. 
There was even talk of an impending PASOK-ization of the PSOE.  The sky seemed 
the limit for the upstart Podemos in the second half of 2014.  But there was much wishful 
thinking in this premature diagnosis.  The comparison with Greece was in important ways 
misleading.  For starters, the Spanish economy is much bigger than that of Greece, its state 
more capable of collecting taxes from the middle and upper classes (though no analyst 
would deny that upper class tax evasion is widespread in Spain as well).  Perhaps more 
crucially, the contraction of the Spanish economy after the bursting of the bubble, painful 
though it has been, simply pales in comparison to the veritable freefall experienced in 
Greece, where the contraction has been worse than any experienced in Europe since the 
Great Depression.   
Syriza’s victory in January of 2015 was hailed as a harbinger of good things to come 
amongst Podemos enthusiasts inside and outside of Spain at the time, to be sure.  But 
before long, the difficulties that the Tsipras government encountered in fulfilling its 
campaign promise and converting its electoral success into an effective break with austerity 
within the Eurozone appeared to have a knock-on effect on perceptions of Podemos as well.  
By the time Tsipras surrendered to the Troika in July, Podemos was looking much less like 
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the “center of Spain’s new political game-board.”  The promise of a break with austerity 
within the Eurozone had come to seem ever more likely a contradiction in terms, a utopian 
fantasy, a populist fib.  Needless to say, this turn of events in Greece would contribute to a 
decline in support for Podemos, rendering its purposely vague electoral promises less 
plausible in the eyes of the Spanish public.  After peaking at 23.9% of intended votes in 
January of 2015, the proportion projected had fallen to 16.5% by April, and to 15.3% by July 
(http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/08/04/media/1438681849_641670.html).  
In sum, the difficulties encountered by the Syriza government served as an 
ideological stick of sorts, reinforcing the hegemonic perception that There Is No Alternative 
(TINA) to the policies of neoliberal austerity – at least not one that does not entail a very 
unpopular exit from the Eurozone.  Worse yet, these difficulties were portrayed in 
mainstream Spanish press as evidence that any attempt to pursue an alternative is only 
likely to make things worse.  
The difficulties of Podemos after its brief honeymoon in the court of Spanish public 
opinion cannot be pinned on the problems of Syriza alone.  Multiple domestic factors were 
at work as well.  Perhaps foremost among them would be certain indicators of economic 
recovery – significant enough to render credible the claims of the advocates of austerity 
that the sacrifices have not been for naught, that there is light at the end of the tunnel.   
The economy began growing again in the second trimester of 2013, and has 
continued growing ever since.  By June of 2015 an OECD report was projecting “robust 
growth … over the next two years,” growth which it claimed would be “driven by very 
supportive financial conditions, the depreciation of the euro, lower oil prices and 
strengthening trading partner growth” (http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/spain-economic-
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forecast-summary.htm).  In addition to the stick of the Syriza example, then, positive 
economic indicators provided an ideological carrot as well, rendering sufficiently plausible 
the claims of the government about light at the end of the tunnel.     
Perceptions are of course crucial here, and for the vast majority of citizens, at least, 
hardly based on anything approximating reflective equilibrium.  As Przeworski has forcefully 
argued, in general “people are willing to suffer in the short run,” so long as “they believe in 
the long run.”  But in representative democracies, politicians have to get elected and re-
elected.  This poses a serious problem for any party running on a platform promising 
sacrifices in the short run, simply because “people do not know how long the transition will 
be.”  Indeed, painful economic reforms represent a “plunge into opaque waters,” in which 
people neither “know where the bottom is” nor “how long they will have to hold their 
breath” (1991, p.168).  Confidence, thus, intervenes, shaping popular reactions.   
Rebounding confidence in the Spanish economy would be especially strong amongst 
Spanish businessmen, and was even detectable before the economy had begun to grow 
again, as reflected in the Industrial Confidence Indicator, which began consistently creeping 
upward from the beginning of 2013, and had reached pre-crisis levels by the end of 2015 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/business-confidence).  Indicators of consumer 
confidence have followed suit (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/consumer-
confidence).  Even so, the proportion of the Spanish public perceiving the economy to be in 
good shape in the present has remained dismal and stagnant since 2009, at under 10%.  
Crucially, however, the proportion of Spaniards who fear that the economy will be worse in 
a year’s time, which reached 40% in 2013, has since plummeted.  By mid-2016, it was a 
mere 15%, well under pre-crisis levels 
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(http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/11_barometros/index.jsp).  With such rebounding 
confidence in the Spanish economy, the appeal of any promise to break with the economic 
status quo, and thus the prospects for Podemos, took a turn for the worse.   
The mass media played a significant role in both the spectacular rise and subsequent 
cooling off of public opinion towards Podemos as well.  Pablo Iglesias emerged in 2014 as a 
veritable media celebrity, his ubiquitous presence and strong performance on the talk show 
circuit consistently impressive.  But the initially near-universal benevolent coverage of the 
new party predictably gave way to more sceptical treatment in 2015, especially as the 
December general election approached, with right-wing media waxing hysterical about 
alleged links to Venezuela and even Iran.   
Much of the initial enthusiasm surrounding Podemos was linked to the hope that it 
could ride the wave of citizen indignation – so powerfully expressed in the 15M movement – 
straight into the Moncloa.  The image they relied on was that of a political tsunami capable 
of wiping away the country’s deeply entrenched clientelistic networks and systemic 
corruption, the so-called casta.   
But the Indignado movement was never anything close to a tsunami.   Even in its hay 
day, the proportion of Spaniards mobilized into the movement was very low – the absolute 
majority won by the PP in the general election just a few months after the eruption of 15M 
in 2011 the clearest reminder of this inconvenient fact, despite how powerful that wave of 
social mobilization might have appeared in the twitter-sphere or on Facebook newsfeeds.  
Even worse, much evidence suggests that the Indignado movement never managed to 
incorporate or mobilize the working class strata most devastated by the current crisis.   The 
same is unfortunately true for Podemos as well (Calvo and Alvarez 2015).  
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The sad truth is that the Indignados were always a distinct minority; the 
depoliticized, apathetic and quiescent majority of Spaniards can more aptly be described, 
not as Indignados, but rather, as resignados.  The prospect of mass mobilization, expansion 
of participation and consciousness, much less the re-articulation and transformation of 
dominant social imaginaries and fissures, remains far-fetched.    
Nor should the status quo biases entrenched in Spain’s electoral laws be forgotten.  
These laws both (1) over-represent the conservative countryside and (2) punish electoral 
divisions, especially on the left (Montero 1997).  Which is why more cynical commentators 
close to the PSOE even conjectured complicity on the Spanish right in promoting the mass 
media’s early love affair with Pablo Iglesias, all in the name of the game of electoral divide 
and conquer.   
Such conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the threat posed to the “left” of the 
political spectrum by the end of the trend towards “bi-partyism” would prove very real.  The 
December 2015 general election witnessed a clear surge in terms of support for parties on 
the “left” in comparison with the result of the 2011 general election, when the PSOE and IU 
had managed to capture together just over 35% of all votes cast.  By contrast, in December 
of 2015, the proportion that voted for either the PSOE or Podemos or IU would rise to over 
46%, almost 2% better than the PP’s 2011 performance.  Even so, this 46% would be divided 
across three parties, in an electoral system built to punish divisions, especially on the left, 
and thus translated into 25 fewer seats than those won by the PP in 2011 – 14 fewer than 
what would be needed for a majority in the Congreso de Diputados, even assuming the 
political will for such a left-leaning coalition could be mustered.    
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The PSOE fared the best among the nominally left-leaning options in the December 
2015 election.  Now led by the young and dapper, but “responsible,” Pedro Sánchez - 
generational renewal of the casta having been achieved at the very top of the party already, 
in no small measure in response to the threat posed by Pablo Iglesias on the populist left – 
their proportion of the vote was down 6% from 2011, at 22%, which translated to 90 seats.  
They thus managed to fend off the fate of PASOK-ization, despite registering their worst 
result since the transition to democracy.    
But Podemos was right at their heels – performing better than the majority of polls 
had predicted, with nearly 21% of votes, though this translated into significantly fewer 
seats, 69.  Not surprisingly, this impressive surge did great damage to the electoral fate of 
the post-communist IU, which after deciding against a coalition with Podemos and 
presenting itself in a truncated coalition named (with a good dose of unintentional irony) 
Unidad Popular en Común, hemorrhaged votes and seats, down from 6.9% to 3.7% of the 
vote, and from 11 to 2 seats.  Commentators on the left were quick to draw the conclusion 
that the failure to consummate a “confluencia” (“coming together”) had been a tactical 
error for both formations.  Such commentators pointed to the municipal elections in May of 
2015, in which coalitions embodying such “confluencia” between Podemos and IU/IC (Ahora 
en Común and Barcelona en Comú) emerged victorious in the country’s two biggest cities, to 
buttress their case.  And to the fact that in the general election,  together, the number of 
votes received by the two formations would have translated into 85 instead of 71 seats, 
which in turn would have both strengthened the overall representation of nominal left-
leaning formations and the “real” left vis-à-vis the “nominal” or center-left 
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(http://www.eldiario.es/politica/GRAFICO-Congreso-Podemos-confluencias-
IU_0_464754323.html).  
A problematic conclusion – and one that the leadership of Podemos had resisted, 
most vocally Iñigo Errejón, who had famously insisted that Podemos should try to distance 
itself from the language of “left” versus “right.”  Of course, such distancing was always going 
to be a difficult sell, given the aesthetics, the rhetorical style and the background of its 
leaders.  And in the run-up to the general election, it soon became apparent that the 
Spanish public was unpersuaded by the idea that Podemos was somehow beyond left and 
right.   Indeed, the CIS’s pre-electoral survey showed that the public perceived the new 
party to be clearly situated to the left of the Socialist party and even to the left of the post-
communist IU, with 52% viewing Podemos as located at either a 1 or 2 on a 1 to 10 left-right 
spectrum (and an average of 2.09), compared with only 43% so viewing IU (avg. 2.46) (and 
6.8% so viewing the socialists, avg. 4.38) (http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-
Archivos/Marginales/3100_3119/3104/es3104mar.pdf).  This widespread perception of 
Podemos as situated near the “extreme” left revealed the difficulties inherent in the upstart 
formation’s aspiration to form a truly counter-hegemonic bloc, and fixed a definite ceiling to 
its electoral appeal.   
Yet Podemos was heartened by its performance in the December election, and 
believed momentum to be on its side.  It thus succumbed to the illusion of an imminent 
sorpasso, so struck a confident, even belligerent tone, in the weeks and months that 
followed.  At the same time, it worked on securing a consummated coalition with Izquierda 
Unida this time around, in preparation for a snap election it hoped could resolve the 
stalemated result of the December contest, and perhaps even catapult it into power.  A 
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miscalculation, it turns out, but one that did not go uncontested at the level of the 
leadership (with echoes amongst the rank-and-file), pitting Iglesias against Errejón.  
Nor would partisan divisions be limited to the “left” of the political spectrum.  As 
public opinion began to cool towards Podemos in the first four months of 2015, another 
“anti-establishment” alternative surged – one not widely perceived to be on the left: 
namely, Ciudadanos (C’s), a party that has been around since 2006 in Catalonia but only 
recently began organizing at the state-wide level.  It was originally, and to a significant 
extent still remains, a single-issue party of sorts – its issue being the defence of Spanish 
unity.  In January of 2015, C’s was polling at 3%, but by April its proportion of intended votes 
had increased to 14% (http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-
Archivos/Marginales/3100_3119/3104/es3104mar.pdf).    
Ciudadanos would represent a serious electoral threat to the ruling Partido Popular.  
Its leader, Albert Rivera, is a well-groomed, well-dressed, and well-spoken young man, 
almost as handsome as socialist Pedro Sánchez, though not as tall.  Throughout 2015, Rivera 
consistently polled as the country’s most popular politician, with 50% of the Spanish public 
registering their approval of him, well ahead of the 38% registered for Sánchez, much less 
the 31% for the pony-tailed Pablo Iglesias, and the mere 25% for the old, bearded Prime 
Minister (http://electomania.es/metroscopia-el-psoe-ganaria-las-elecciones-cae-
podemos/). 
There are more substantive reasons why C’s has posed a threat to the PP as well.  
Crucially, the party has remained virtually unsullied by implication in the country’s systemic 
corruption, largely because of its relative absence from municipal level politics.  Moreover, 
the Spanish public perceives C’s as being situated on the center-right of the ideological 
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spectrum, with an average of 6.18 on the 1 to 10 scale.  This score is much closer to the 
center than the PP, which is perceived to be near the far-right by Spaniards, at an average of 
8.26.  Indeed, even those who admit to having voted for the PP in the 2011 general election 
perceive the ruling party to be situated on average at 7.59, well to the right of where they 
place themselves (on average 6.60) (http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-
Archivos/Marginales/3100_3119/3104/cru3104votog2011.html). Yet, in terms of party 
program and potential populist appeal, because of its impeccable credentials when it comes 
to defending the Spanish nation, Ciudadanos is nevertheless hard to outflank on the 
Spanish-nationalist front.   
Despite this threat, the Partido Popular still received the most votes in the December 
election, though with a mere 28%, nearly 16% lower than in 2011, which translated into 123 
seats in the Congreso de Diputados, down from 186, and 52 shy of an absolute majority.  For 
its part, Ciudadanos received a respectable 14% share of votes, which translated into 40 
seats.   
All told, the result of the December 2015 election was a virtual stalemate, with a 
fragmented and polarized Congreso de Diputados that would prove incapable of forming a 
new government.  New elections were called for the end of June.  In the meantime, Rajoy 
remained at the helm of the now interim government.  A half a year of interim or non-
government, in which, as we have seen, indicators of confidence in the Spanish economy 
continued to rebound, and in which no new painful austerity measures could be passed. 
In March, the Budget Minister released the country’s deficit figures for the previous 
year, which stood at 5.16% of the GNP, well above the 4.2% the government had promised 
Brussels, not to mention the 3% limit fixed in the Eurozone’s Stability Pact (which the 
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country exceeded for the eighth straight year).  This despite the fact that Spain had grown 
an impressive 3.2%, twice the rate of the Eurozone as a whole 
(http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/03/31/actualidad/1459418481_044567.html).  
Just weeks before the snap election, the Troika would publish a report on the country, in 
which it would issue praise for the government for its handling of the economy, but would 
also lament “the relaxation of fiscal consolidation,” singling out for particular admonishment 
the Regional Governments and the Social Security system 
(http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/06/17/57641775e5fdeadb418b4589.html).      
It was in this economic climate that the second election took place.  An election 
which again failed to deliver a clear majority, and thereby perpetuated the country’s 
political stalemate, albeit with non-identical results.  Apathy nudged up, participation went 
down, more than 3%, to just under 70%.  The Partido Popular, still much weakened 
compared to 2011, nevertheless came out relatively strengthened this time around, up 
nearly 700,000 votes, raising its share more than 4 points, to 33%, and increasing its number 
of seats 14, up to 137.  For its part, Ciudadanos again performed respectably, though it was 
down over half a percentage point, for which it was punished, losing 8 seats, leaving it with 
32, leaving a hypothetical PP-C’s parliamentary alliance still 7 seats short from the majority 
required for securing the investiture of a prime minister and the formation of a new 
government.      
Meanwhile, on the left of the representative spectrum, the much-anticipated 
sorpasso of the socialists by the electoral coalition Unidos Podemos failed to materialize.  
The much-touted “confluencia” between Podemos and Izquierda Unida did not bear fruit. 
After “coming together,” the coalition Unidos Podemos lost over a million votes from what 
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they had managed to sum separately a half year earlier, though they equalled their number 
of seats.  As for the socialists, they too lost votes (fewer), and lost 5 seats as well, though 
the mere fact that they had fended off the sorpasso led these results to be received with a 
palpable sense of relief by party leaders and friendly press.  
 The Brexit referendum took place just three days before the second election in 
Spain, and the shockwaves emanating from the verdict of the British people were soon felt 
in the Iberian peninsula.  At the end of July, the European Commission announced it would 
cancel fines against Spain and Portugal for failing to comply with the Eurozone’s budgetary 
rules.  It was reported that last-minute lobbying by none other than German Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schauble had convinced Commissioner Junker to reverse course 
(http://www.politico.eu/article/no-fines-for-portugal-spain-over-budget-failures-european-
commission-deficit/).   
Apparently, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, European authorities have come to 
conclude that avoiding further damage to the EU’s much tarnished image is a top priority – 
indeed, an even more pressing concern than any credibility sacrificed by failing to enforce 
“fiscal consolidation” within the Eurozone.  No doubt, these same authorities have been 
paying close attention to the political stalemate in Spain, and rationally fear that heavy-
handed, punitive measures could backfire and render more salient anti-austerity sentiment 
across the peninsula, which could in turn potentially undermine “the substantial efforts” 
and “ambitious structural reforms” already undertaken by national authorities over the past 
several years.   
 Which is not to say that European authorities are no longer concerned with “fiscal 
consolidation.”  To the contrary, they remain very worried, and with each passing month of 
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interim government more nervous.  Nor is it a secret that these same authorities firmly 
desire to see a government capable of passing new legislation and delivering on the 
country’s promises to EU institutions.  In the week after the second election, ex-Prime 
Minister Felipe González intervened to air such concerns in an op-ed in the pages of El País, 
in which he implored: “We have already lost eight months in this strange interim situation.  
It is only logical that we put an end to this situation as soon as possible, which would be best 
for everybody, or at the very least, least costly” 
(http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/07/06/opinion/1467826976_877593.html).  The message 
for his remaining followers: the socialist party should abstain in the second round of voting 
for Rajoy’s investiture, out of a sense of political responsibility.   
 Easier said than done.  Divisions among the socialists have abounded since the June 
election – with some fearing that the party’s core constituency will punish them in the next 
election if they allow the PP to govern 
(http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/elecciones/20160627/402792223557/psoe-
descarta-apoyo-abstencion-rajoy.html).  Meanwhile, a chastened Podemos leadership has 
taken to courting the socialists, urging Sánchez to consider heading an alternative 
government along the lines of the socialist-led left-coalition now in power in Portugal 
(http://okdiario.com/espana/2016/08/16/podemos-insiste-psoe-gobierno-alternativo-rajoy-
320370).  
 In the aftermath of the June election, Sánchez was quick to recognize the PP as 
victor, and to blame the “intransigent” Pablo Iglesias, whom he accused of having let 
personal and partisan interests squander the opportunity to form a progressive coalition 
after the December election, when it had existed, clearly implying such an opportunity no 
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longer existed, that the PP had won the prerogative to govern 
(http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/2782857/0/elecciones-generales-2016-psoe-pedro-
sanchez/).  Though he has yet to facilitate this option. 
  In previous electoral cycles when absolute majorities were absent, Catalan and 
Basque nationalist forces have lent support and secured a stable government in Madrid, 
usually in exchange for measures increasing devolution.  But the rise of Ciudadanos has 
stymied this formula.   
Which brings us to the subject of Catalonia.  Neither the rise of Ciudadanos nor the 
relative buoyance of the Partido Popular – the fact that ever since 2011, the most reputable 
opinion polls have consistently found the PP to rank as the most popular party in the 
country (or at least the least unpopular party), despite stratospheric unemployment, despite 
the Bárcenas scandal – none of this would be in the least likely were it not for the climate of 
nationalist polarization around Catalonia.   
 
The Crisis of the Estado de las Autonomías 
Over the past six years, the Catalan regional authorities have grown increasingly defiant of 
the Spanish Constitutional Order.  The turn to populist tactics and a more contentious brand 
of politics, especially the deliberate transgression by the Catalan authorities of the rules of 
the representative-democratic game as enshrined in the Constitutional order, are 
simultaneously symptomatic and exacerbating cause of the broader crisis of confidence 
amongst Spaniards about the nature and quality of their representative-democratic 
institutions.  
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In the process of secessionist mobilization, the nationalist movement has 
increasingly supplemented its traditional romantic repertoire with a materialist discourse of 
economic grievance, according to which the Spanish central government is guilty of “fiscally 
plundering,” even “robbing,” the region as a whole – a potent populist trope in the doubly 
propitious climate of extremely high unemployment combined with severe regressions in 
social rights (Gillespie and Gray 2015). 
Many on the left in Spain and internationally look with considerable sympathy on the 
mobilization in favour of self-determination and/or independence for Catalonia.  There are 
multiple reasons why this is so – some more legitimate than others.  However, one thing 
that tends to unite these left-wing sympathizers is their reliance upon and perpetuation of 
mystified and sociologically naïve accounts of the “popular, grass roots” bases allegedly 
fuelling the recent cycle of nationalist mobilization (e.g. Guibernau 2014).  Such accounts 
ignore the crucial role played by the regional mass media and the regional authorities in the 
mobilization process, as well as the organic links between the Catalan government and 
regional administrative apparatus with such “civil society” organizations as the ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural (Olmeda 2014).  In turn, implicit in these mystified accounts of the recent 
wave of mobilization is a rather whitewashed or romanticized indifference to the class 
composition as well as the hegemonic class project advanced by the Catalan nationalist 
movement (Martinez and Barceló 2014).  
The left-wing “fellow travellers” of the secessionist surge insist upon the potential 
for the wave of secessionist mobilization to break left, at least in Catalonia and maybe even 
in the rest of Spain.  By delivering a powerful blow against the existing constitutional order 
and the existing state, so these intellectuals/activists argue, the Catalan nationalist 
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movement – even unwittingly – promises to provide a golden opportunity for a definitive 
break with austerity, or more utopian yet, might even precipitate a revolutionary turn of 
events (Ali 2014; Delgado 2012). 
Such arguments underestimate the level of working-class alienation, indifference, 
even occasional hostility, toward the so-called “procés” in Catalonia, not to mention in the 
rest of the country.  Nevertheless, if in the process of mobilization, anti-austerity and even 
anti-capitalist fractions were to manage to gain the upper hand within the nationalist 
movement, then the legal break with the constitutional status quo could perhaps translate 
into a re-equilibration much more favourable to experimentation with left-wing alternatives 
to neoliberal austerity and even with direct-democratic models of governance in Catalonia.   
The prospect cannot be entirely ruled out.  After all, over the course of the ongoing 
crisis, the party system in Catalonia has undergone a transformation at least as serious as 
the one underway in Spain.  Significant fragmentation as well as polarization can be clearly 
detected.   
The credibility of the center-right Catalan nationalist party Convergència 
Democràtica, recently rebranded the Partido Demócrata Catalán, has been significantly 
damaged, especially in the aftermath of scandalous revelations in 2013 about the Andorran 
and Swiss bank accounts of Jordi Pujol.  This, in combination with the application of painful 
cuts, not to mention unemployment rates nearly equal to those of the rest of Spain, put the 
Catalan government in a bind not altogether dissimilar to that of its adversaries in Madrid.  
Indeed, by June of 2013, there were clear indications of a possible impending sorpasso 
within the secessionist camp – as support for CiU dipped down to under 20% in polls, while 
its governing partner, Esquerra Republicana surged ahead.   
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Regional premier Artur Mas called for an early election, held on the 27th of 
September of 2015, declared as a plebiscite on independence, with the promise of a 
unilateral declaration to that effect should the forces campaigning in favour of it obtain a 
victory at the polls.  For the purpose of the plebiscite, Mas would commit to the formation 
of an unprecedented electoral coalition under the banner of Junts pel Sí (“Together for Yes”) 
– a coalition that includes Mas’s own Convergència Democràtica, along with its governing 
partner Esquerra Republicana, as well as activists from heavily-subsidised “civil society” 
groups such as the ANC and Òmnium Cultural.  Mas even agreed to sacrifice his own 
protagonism in the process, running as the number four candidate on the list. 
The plebiscitary election temporarily suspended the prospect of sorpasso within the 
Catalan nationalist camp, substituting it with a post-partisan fusion of sorts.  The Junts pel Sí 
platform managed to win just under 40% of the vote, in an election marked by polarization 
and a record-high turn-out of 77%.  However, this translated into 62 seats, nine less than 
the sum of CiU and ERC in 2012, and 10 less than their sum in 2010.       
Meanwhile, an “anti-system,” even avowedly anti-capitalist, left has surged within 
the nationalist movement – the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, which received 8.2% of votes 
and 10 seats.  Though far from representing a groundswell, these “anti-system” votes still 
proved enough to push secessionist forces over the threshold of a parliamentary (if not 
electoral) majority, rendering the CUP a “king-maker” of sorts.   
The CUP does present a substantially different class project to the one still 
hegemonic within the Catalan nationalist movement, at least in principle.  Indeed, its 
advocacy and – to some extent, its internal practice – of radical direct democracy, including 
its support for democratic control of the economy, combined with its open opposition to 
the Euro – makes its project in crucial respects a less contradictory, more coherent 
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alternative to neoliberalism than the one incarnated in Podemos (Botran 2012; Palmer 
2016).  However, in terms of its class composition, it ultimately suffers from the same 
weakness as Podemos, though in a more extreme fashion: namely, its inability to connect 
with, much less to mobilize, the bulk of the fragmented, depoliticized, and apathetic urban 
working classes. 
After an intense internal debate that included a most unlikely assembly-vote tie of 
1515-1515, the party would decide to use its leverage to condition the composition of the 
new Catalan government, forcing Mas to step down, albeit to be replaced by a hand-picked 
and loyal successor, Carles Puigdemont.   
In the wake of the plebiscitary election, the new majority in the Catalan Parliament 
would invoke its “democratic mandate” to pass a resolution in which it solemnly declared 
the beginning of a unilateral “process of democratic disconnection” with the Spanish state, 
announcing its intention to disobey any Spanish laws or rulings of the Constitutional 
Tribunal contradicting the will of the Catalan people as expressed in the Catalan Parliament.  
Thereby ratcheting up further the confrontation between the Catalan regional authorities 
and the Spanish constitutional order.  At the beginning of December, Spain’s high court 
would predictably declare the parliament’s resolution null and void – the fourth such clear 
verdict against the open defiance of Catalan authorities in less than two years, warning that 
the regional authorities were “ignoring the constitutional limits of political action,” and in 
failing to respect the rule of law were jeopardizing one of the fundamental “bases of social 
peace”(http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/paginas/Sentencia.aspx?co
d=21437).   
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The constitutional prescriptions for coping with such a crisis are in principle quite 
clear.  Article II of the Spanish Constitution declares “the indivisible unity of the Spanish 
nation.”  Moreover, in Part VIII, dedicated to the Territorial Organization of the State, 
Section 155.1 states in no uncertain terms that “If a Self-governing Community does not 
fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way that 
is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the Government, after having lodged 
a complaint with the President of the Self-governing Community and failed to receive 
satisfaction therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of the 
Senate, take all measures necessary to compel the Community to meet said obligations, or 
to protect the above-mentioned general interest.”  By compel, the use of force is explicitly 
sanctioned.  And Section 155.2 renders further explicit that “[w]ith a view to implementing 
the measures provided for in the foregoing paragraph, the Government may issue 
instructions to all the authorities of the Self-governing Communities.”   
But constitutional prescriptions do not always reflect the real dynamics working to 
constrict and constrain the horizons of the politically-possible.  The Catalan nationalists’ 
defection from constitutional loyalty has already significantly undermined, perhaps critically, 
the governability of the country from within the confines of that order.   Though a 
demographic minority, their will may simply prove too powerful to ignore.  This because the 
Catalan nationalists have long been hegemonic in the regional parliament and in the 
regional state apparatus more generally (Martinez 2002; Miley 2006).   
Which means, at the end of the day, even if high-level functionaries were all sacked, 
the mid-level functionaries who would be called upon to implement any possible 
instructions from the central government following the nominal suspension of autonomy in 
accordance with Section 155 would themselves likely overwhelmingly pertain to Catalan 
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nationalist ranks.  The efficacy and effectiveness in implementing the will of the Spanish 
government under such circumstances can be expected to be quite low.  The repeated 
defiance of the Catalan educational system, its refusal to implement recent High Court 
rulings mandating an increased presence of Castilian in the primary and secondary schools, 
is perhaps indicative in this regard (Garvía and Miley 2013).  On the other hand, most 
functionaries likely lack sufficient conviction to risk losing their highly-coveted permanent 
jobs, it seems safe to assume that at least a minimum level of compliance can be expected.  
Here is the crucial test for the nationalist movement – will the functionaries of the Catalan 
regional government have the courage of their nationalist convictions to risk their jobs?    
In principle, both the rule of law and the balance of coercive force remain on the 
side of the Spanish government in the on-going conflict with the Catalan authorities.  
However, in practice the Constitutional order requires the consent of the Catalan 
authorities, who have always sociologically been a crucial base of the stability of the 
constitutional order.   
To invoke the terms of structural-functionalism, the balance of integrative forces 
holding the country together has certainly shifted over the past forty years of democratic 
rule in Spain.  Economic integration into Europe has meant an end to any benefit of 
belonging to a protected Spanish market.  At the same time, political integration into 
Europe, combined with military integration into NATO, has meant an end to the threat of 
military coup and authoritarian backlash.  As a result, both carrots and sticks facilitating the 
cohesion of the country’s quasi-federal system have over time been eroded.  Meanwhile, 
the hegemony of the Catalan nationalist movement over the emergent regional state 
apparatus, the regional mass media, and especially the educational system, have changed 
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the contours of dominant “social imaginaries,” and therefore the balance of “reasonable” 
horizons of pragmatic compromise and consent, in a creeping, centrifugal direction.  
The turbulence of the economic-cum-political crisis has provided the Catalan 
nationalist movement with an opportunity to channel a groundswell of discontent amongst 
threatened middle classes into the illusion of Catalan independence.  There is by no means a 
clear majority, much less a supermajority, in Catalonia in favour of this illusion.  But an 
overwhelming minority committed to this goal has managed, in the context of the crisis, to 
rapidly shift the terrain of the center ground, the terms of common sense, decisively in that 
direction in Catalonia.  Witness the clear majority in the Catalan Parliament in favour of the 
so-called “right to decide” – the right to hold a referendum.  Witness as well the clear 
majority in favour of something like the Basque fiscal deal as well, and for further 
Constitutional entrenchment of Catalan jurisdiction over language policy and education 
(though reliable surveys of the attitudes of the general public about such possible policies 
have been surprisingly sparse).   
The Catalan nationalists’ determination to forge ahead in their rebellion against the 
Constitutional order has already forced many issues nearly unthinkable just a few years ago, 
and certainly has the potential to create new facts on the ground.  But so too have they 
provoked a backlash, a surge in support for measures of re-centralization in the rest of the 
country, not to mention a considerable amount of polarization in Catalan society itself.   
The European context is also of course crucial.  The European Community is, after all, 
nominally a community based upon the rule of law, and the Spanish authorities certainly 
have the rule of law on their side.  Nevertheless, in the court of European and perhaps even 
world public opinion, the Spanish authorities remain suspect of authoritarian leanings, over 
forty years after Franco’s death, and the Catalan nationalist cause symbolically associated 
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still with the struggle against fascism in Spain, and therefore with democracy.  Any 
compulsory suppression of the expressed will of the Catalan regional government is likely to 
be widely interpreted through such a lens.  On the other hand, the consummation of a 
unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Catalan authorities stands little 
chance of recognition by European authorities, and the possible majority in favour of 
independence quickly vanishes once the prospect of exclusion from Europe is entered into 
the equation.   
Thus far, the Spanish authorities have refrained from invoking Section 155 of the 
Constitution.  However, former premier Artur Mar, along with two other members of his 
government, are set to face trial, charged by the Spanish general attorney with 
“disobedience, perverting the course of justice, misuse of public funds, and abuse of power 
in relation to the unofficial referendum on Catalan independence” held in November 2014.  
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/catalan-president-face-several-
charges-after-unofficial-independence-referendum).  A similar fate will likely meet current 
premier Carles Puigdemont, as well as current president of the Catalan Parliament, Carme 
Forcadell, come Fall, for deliberating disobeying the orders of Spain’s High Court and forging 
ahead with the so-called “process of disconnection” 
(http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/Gobierno-TC-Forcadell-responsable-
desobediencia_0_542445979.html).   
In addition to such legal measures, other less legitimate tactics have been pursued as 
well, as the tape of Spain’s Minister of the Interior, Jorge Fernández Díaz, encouraging the 
head of the Catalan Aunti-fraud Office to dig up information to discredit secessionist 
politicians – a tape which surfaced just five days before the second general election – has 
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revealed (http://www.publico.es/politica/fernandez-diaz-conspiro-jefe-oficina.html).  Such 
troubling indicators suggest that an end to the still-escalating confrontation between the 
Spanish and Catalan authorities is nowhere in sight. 
There are nevertheless serious pressures by powerful actors both within Spain and in 
Europe for a compromise, even if it means a constitutional rupture – allowing for a 
referendum on the issue of independence, and perhaps the concession of a Basque-style 
fiscal deal as well.  The support lent by five Convergència deputies for the composition of 
the Mesa del Congreso that had been pacted by the PP and Ciudadanos three weeks after 
the second election led some to speculate that both sides had reached a point where they 
might be willing to step back from the precipice of ever-further confrontation.  But by the 
end of July, such speculation had ceased, after the Catalan Parliament passed another 
resolution reaffirming its commitment to the “process of disconnection.”  Evidently, the 
current balance of political forces both within Catalonia and across the country precludes 
such a de-escalation for now.   
If the outcome of the crisis of the country’s constitutional regime thus remains an 
open question, the regime of austerity would seem safely entrenched.  The conflict between 
Spanish and Catalan authorities has yet to include any significant divergence in terms of the 
commitment to austerity expressed and pursued by public officials at both levels of 
government.  A most telling episode in this regard would occur in the Spring of 2016.  When 
Spain’s budget minister Cristobal Montoro announced the country’s deficit figures in late 
March, he explicitly blamed “overspending by regional governments,” and singled out for 
particular admonishment the Catalan authorities, whom he jibed had “spent 2015 deciding 
whether or not to call elections” instead of focusing on the deficit 
33 
 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/send-the-troika-back-to-spain-
catalan-finance-chief-says).  The Catalan government replied, in the person of its Vice 
President, the head of Esquerra Republicana, Oriol Junqueras, by requesting European 
authorities to send another team of inspectors to Spain, and indeed suggesting “that 
European officials should intervene in the national budgeting process because the central 
government’s decisions are ‘arbitrary, inefficient and unjust’ while ignoring EU guidance.”  
In Junqueras’ words: “We’re delighted to collaborate with European institutions … Better a 
mission in situ than a fine” (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/send-
the-troika-back-to-spain-catalan-finance-chief-says).  A reply which certainly bodes ill for the 
plausibility of the illusion that the rise of Esquerra Republicana and the pending demise of 
Convergència might provide an opportunity for the region to break with austerity.  
Even in the unlikely event that the channelling of citizen indignation in a decidedly 
nationalist direction were to lead to the emergence of a more than nominally left-wing 
nationalist power bloc dominant at the level of Catalan party politics, one openly committed 
to a break with austerity, the likelihood that such a power bloc could remain hegemonic if it 
were to openly embrace exit from the Eurozone is close to nil.  In this respect, the lesson of 
the resounding electoral defeat suffered by the Left Platform in Greece, in its opposition to 
the pragmatic capitulation of Syriza before the demands of the Troika, should not be so 
swiftly swept under the rug by left-wing enthusiasts of the current secessionist surge.  The 
vast majority of the Catalan public, even the vast majority of those who dream of 
“independence,” remain committed to the European project, and even to the Eurozone.  
Which means that Catalan “independence,” even if the process were to result in the ascent 
of nominally left-wing forces in Catalonia, is highly unlikely to entail an effective break with 
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austerity.  At least insofar as the Catalan public has a say in the terms of its “self-
determination.” 
Of course, the scenario of forced exclusion from Europe could create political 
opportunities for the “independentist left” that would be highly unlikely to materialize 
through deliberate choice in the ballot box.   But forced exclusion could only occur after 
international recognition of Catalan independence, to begin with – a scenario also highly 
unlikely to occur, unless the Spanish authorities were to commit the tremendous blunder of 
responding to a unilateral declaration of independence with aggressive executive decrees 
and excessive coercive force.    
 
Conclusion 
The economic-cum-political crisis has hit Spain like an earthquake, suddenly exposing 
underlying structural weaknesses of its constitutional edifice accumulated over the past 
decades.  The explicit defection of the Catalan authorities from loyalty to that order renders 
the edifice susceptible to collapse.     
Thomas Jefferson once complained that constitutions represent the tyranny of the 
dead over the living.  For the constitutional order to survive, it must avoid appearing as such 
– not only among citizens in the country at large, but, perhaps especially, among a minority 
as powerful as the Catalan regional authorities.  Especially in the European context, 
especially given the history of Spain, any resort to coercive force on the part of Spanish 
central authorities, even to uphold the Constitution, will be widely interpreted as 
authoritarian intransigence working to suppress the legitimate democratic aspirations of the 
Catalan people.   
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This gap between legality and legitimacy could well determine the denouement of 
the current impasse, in favour of compromise, which means in practice further devolution, 
though not full-fledged sovereignty.  Regardless of what the letter of the Constitution says.  
After all, the spirit of the 1978 Constitutional order is one of compromise amongst the de 
facto pillars of stability in Spanish society, including crucially the Catalan middle classes.  On 
the other hand, the polarization associated with the mobilization in favour of secession has 
triggered a backlash as well, rendering the will to compromise more feeble on both sides of 
the nationalist divide.   
In the meantime, the fact that the political agenda remains so firmly focused on the 
Catalan question has undoubtedly benefitted the Spanish right, granting it the opportunity 
to wrap itself proudly in the Spanish flag, to stand firmly as defender of the territorial 
integrity of the nation and of the constitutional order against the threat of the separatistas, 
to shift the focus of attention away from the subjects of corruption and austerity (Chaqués-
Bonafont 2015: 109).  Indeed, the confrontation with the Catalan authorities continues to 
serve as a most effective smokescreen, capable of channelling some citizens’ indignation, 
while simultaneously dividing and conquering them, pitting middle-class and some working-
class segments against each other, imagined as “national” enemies, while reproducing and 
exacerbating the alienation of most working-class Spaniards from the terms and horizon of 
contestation in public debate, thereby fending off the fundamental threat of fissure of 
society throughout the country, and beyond, along class lines.  
  But the ratcheting up of the “territorial cleavage” vis-à-vis Catalonia has also 
contributed to the country’s inability to form a government.  As Bonnie Field has pointed 
out, “between 1982 and 2011 (before the party system changed), on average it took 37 days 
between elections and investiture.”  But now two elections and nearly nine months have 
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come and gone, and still the formula for forging a majority sufficient for securing the 
investiture of a Prime Minister continues to elude the Spaniards.   
 After the general election of 1996, when the PP found itself in a similar situation, 
with a parliamentary plurality but short of an absolute majority, it could count on the 
support of the Catalan and Basque nationalists to secure a stable conservative governing 
majority, in exchange for concessions.  But the repetition of such an alliance has by now 
become anathema on both sides of the territorial divide.  Nor does the salience of the 
Catalan question only inhibit the formation of a right-leaning governing majority.  To the 
contrary, the fundamental divergence in the approaches of Ciudadanos and Podemos to the 
“national” question, emblematically captured in the leadership of Podemos’s insistence 
upon the Catalan demos’s so-called “right to decide” its future status with the rest of the 
country via referendum, has heretofore rendered impossible any PSOE-Ciudadanos-
Podemos alliance as well.  Likewise, the Catalan nationalists’ open defiance of the 
constitutional order, combined with their insistence on a unilateral referendum as a 
condition for any pact, have hindered the potential for any agreement with an already-
divided PSOE, whose leadership justifiably fears that such a move could end up tearing the 
party apart.  
While European authorities and the more conservative among Spaniards have grown 
increasingly nervous over this extended period of government-less governance, the 
sentiment of many on the left was captured well by Francisco Jurado, who in late August 
quipped on Twitter, “Better the institutional impasse we already know than a PP-C’s 
government we have yet to meet” 
(https://twitter.com/SuNotissima/status/769857718026903552).  It remains to be seen how 
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the current impasse will conclude, but whatever governing majority is ultimately formed, it 
is likely to be a very weak one, regardless of whether there are new elections.  Meanwhile, 
the Catalan regional authorities increasingly defy the country’s constitutional order.  But 
despite all this uncertainty, austerity remains for now the only game in Spain. 
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